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Abstract 
 
 
This article explores the interconnections between the media in France and the 
emergence of a Franco-British alliance on the eve of World War Two, emphasising 
how newspaper, radio and newsreel coverage helped mould British perceptions of 
France during the late-1930s. It will argue that British assessments of France, and 
thus France's potential value as a wartime ally, were influenced greatly by the 
dominant representations furnished by the media. In 1936, such representations 
portrayed a polarised France unworthy of British support; by 1939, they depicted a 
strong and united country of inestimable value to Britain. This transformation was 
not simply fortuitous; by the late-1930s, French politicians, conscious of the 
deleterious effect that media representations of a divided France was having on their 
country’s prestige, endeavoured to transform the media from a symptom of 
decadence and malaise into a weapon of unity and strength. 
 
For much of the interwar period Great Britain and France were uneasy 
allies, their relations marred by mutual suspicion and distrust. In the 
deteriorating diplomatic climate of the 1930s, France’s all-too-frequent 
changes of government, ideological skirmishes, and industrial unrest further 
dented British confidence in their old war-time ally. The result was a 
residual perception of a weak and divided country and, as P. M. H. Bell has 
noted, France’s 1940 defeat confirmed longstanding British suspicions that 
France was ‘rotted from within before the blow fell from without’.1 Early 
French accounts of the interwar period did little to counter these prevailing 
conclusions, providing instead the foundations of the ‘decadence’ thesis, 
ascribing France’s defeat to the moral bankruptcy of the entire nation.2 
Translated into foreign affairs, decadence resulted in French policy 
becoming rudderless, subservient to what François Bédarida labelled the 
‘English Governess’.3 More recent accounts provide a corrective to this 
dominant notion of decadence and submissiveness, emphasizing instead 
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French assertiveness and strength.4 This article will add to this recent trend 
by showing how, in the latter-1930s, the French used the media to cultivate 
perceptions overseas (notably in Britain) of a rediscovered unity and 
confidence. 
 
British perceptions of France were informed heavily by the media, 
particularly newspapers. The Paris embassy sent frequent reports on the 
French internal situation based on parliamentary debates, political 
meetings, informal discussions with key members of Parisian society, as well 
as more general gossip, rumour, and hearsay. Nevertheless, as John 
Herman remarks, newspapers ‘provided a rich source of the Embassy’s 
information’.5 For much of the 1930s, such reportage reinforced pejorative 
impressions of a country emasculated by internecine domestic unrest 
bordering on civil war, illustrated by the street violence of February 1934. 
Anglo-French relations were soured further by the 1935 Franco-Soviet Pact, 
whilst the 1936 election of a Popular Front coalition inclusive of 
Communists further alienated a British elite dominated by anti-Bolshevik 
Conservatives. Throughout this period, domestic squabbles in France – 
whether violent disturbances between the far-left and far-right or persistent 
industrial unrest that impeded rearmament – were reported widely in both 
French and British newspapers. The image conveyed was overwhelmingly 
negative; writing in 1935, the British journalist Alexander Werth noted that 
France was ‘in ferment’.6 
 
The accuracy of this predominant image is questionable. Most foreign 
observers of France – notably newspaper correspondents and overseas 
diplomats – were based in Paris, and what happened in Paris was not 
necessarily representative of the country. Manifestations of social unrest 
and political squabbling are more prevalent in larger towns and cities, 
especially a nation’s capital. This matters because, although the French 
press was equally divided between national newspapers and provincial titles, 
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politicians (both French and foreign) relied greatly on the Paris press to 
inform their understandings of newspaper opinion and thus French public 
opinion as a whole (the two often viewed as synonymous). Occasionally, 
reports from the Paris embassy would include consular reports on provincial 
newspapers, but it was predominantly those papers published in Paris that 
were read and cited.7 This focus on the Paris press was not without merit. 
After all, the Paris press often represented a particular political party, 
interest group or organization, and thus conveyed the views of diverse 
constituencies of opinion. In addition, it often provided the information, 
notably international news, which provincial newspapers subsequently 
repeated. Newspaper content also informed attitudes abroad, and with most 
foreign diplomats based in the capital, the Paris press would naturally carry 
more weight.8 And finally, as one British embassy official remarked in April 
1937, ‘it is in Paris that Ministries fall’.9  
 
Only a handful of provincial papers – including the Petite Gironde (Bordeaux) 
and the Dépêche du Toulouse - had an independent editorial line on 
international affairs. Furthermore, within the Paris press, certain journals 
were relied on more than others. Interestingly, the two most widely-read 
papers (by quite some distance) rarely featured in British embassy reports or 
the dossiers of press cuttings kept by French politicians. These were the 
Petit Parisien and Paris-Soir, the only two papers with circulations exceeding 
one million.10 Another feature of the French press was how it became 
increasingly centralised, concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy owners 
resilient enough to survive in an increasingly unprofitable business.11 
Wealthy businessmen like the perfumer François Coty who purchased Le 
Figaro in 1922 and also financed the far-right journals Action Française and 
Le Flambeau. Paris-Soir was owned by the French sugar trust, hence its 
popular nickname Paris-Sucre.12 The concentration of the press affected 
content as well as ownership. The number of local papers dwindled rapidly, 
as did the ‘presse politique’, both usurped by large-circulation dailies that 
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augmented their appeal by sacrificing political commentary for more sport, 
fashion, and other populist features.13 
 
Many ‘political’ journals nonetheless boasted substantial circulations. These 
included, on the political right, Le Journal (411,021) and Le Matin (312,597), 
on the left, the communist Humanité (349,000) - the socialist Le Populaire 
only sold around 157,000 copies – and in the centre, the Œuvre (236,045). A 
number of regional papers also sold in excess of a quarter of a million 
copies, including the Petit Gironde and the La Dépêche de Toulouse.14 Le 
Temps was also widely-cited, principally because it was seen as the semi-
official mouthpiece of the Quai d’Orsay (the French foreign ministry). In 
addition, several prominent and well-connected journalists drew attention to 
themselves, notably those with a pronounced interest in foreign affairs, 
including Geneviève Tabouis, André Géraud (Pertinax), Wladimir 
d’Ormesson, Henri de Kérillis, and prominent journalists on the left, the 
socialist Léon Blum and the communist Gabriel Péri in particular. The 
French government retained privileged links with the media, notably via the 
Havas wire agency, secret government subsidies, and informal contacts with 
prominent editors and proprietors. Adamthwaite suggests that the 
government could have used these links to mould French public opinion in 
support of Prague during the Sudeten crisis, but instead key officials – 
including the Quai d’Orsay’s general-secretary, Alexis Léger and the head of 
its press section, Pierre Comert – ‘anaesthetized’ opinion in support of the 
passive appeasement strategy favoured by foreign minister Georges 
Bonnet.15 The French press was a many-headed beast, comprising populist 
titles owned by wealthy proprietors, journals susceptible to government 
manipulation, and political papers that volubly and passionately articulated 
an ideological agenda. As Matt Perry remarks, ‘press culture in 1930s 
France was vibrant, partisan and venal’.16 
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Despite this, British officials in Paris relied heavily on press content to 
inform their despatches. In fairness, few alternative sources existed; opinion 
polls were in their infancy and not trusted, especially by the French.17 
Cinema newsreels reached a large audience but were expensive to produce 
and lacked substantive commentary. Radio news was similarly limited in 
scope, but the rapid proliferation of radio sets in interwar France – 
ownership increasing from 5,000 at the end of the 1920s to more than 5 
million a decade later – would prove significant. The power of radio and 
newsreels was soon recognised by politicians, and would be used to 
considerable effect by Édouard Daladier at the end of the decade.18 But in 
the mid-1930s, newspapers remained the preferred evidential base, hardly 
surprising given that most British diplomats and politicians belonged to a 
generation that believed the press to be powerful, even as its status began to 
diminish.19 
 
Within the pages of contemporary French newspapers it is easy to find 
indications of a weak, divided, even ‘decadent’ society, helplessly reliant on 
British support. Prior to the 1936 elections that ushered in the Popular 
Front, many French journals expressed concern at the social divisions that 
plagued the nation at a time of growing external peril; one writer in the 
Catholic paper La Croix even compared the situation to 1914.20 The external 
peril was amplified by Germany’s remilitarization of the Rhineland, which 
generated a neo-pacifist response on the French right ('Surtout pas de 
guerre’) rooted in an ideological hostility towards Communism, both 
domestic and international. Newspapers thus perpetuated an image of a 
divided France incapable of opposing Nazi Germany.21 These divisions were 
duly reported to London, although far greater emphasis was placed on a rare 
area of consensus – the need for a co-ordinated Anglo-French response. Any 
indication of discord between Paris and London caused consternation; 
Britain’s ambassador in Paris from 1933 to April 1937, Sir George Clerk, 
noted French alarm at an apparent ‘divergence between the French and 
British points of view’.22  
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The outcome of the 1936 election ensured that the press subsequently 
prioritized domestic over foreign news, and when the latter did feature - 
notably vis-à-vis the Spanish Civil War – the prevailing message was that 
Anglo-French co-operation was paramount. Only far-left journals intimated 
that France could steer a foreign policy course independently of Britain. 
Charles Corbin, France’s ambassador in London (1933-40) , noted that the 
British were similarly convinced that France’s ‘internal problems’ prevented 
Paris from pursuing a firm and independent policy.23 The Berlin 
correspondent of Le Temps offered a degree of confirmation, telling Sir Eric 
Phipps, Britain’s ambassador to Germany before taking the Paris post in 
1937, that Léon Blum’s government had no discernible foreign policy: 
‘Beyond a determination to collaborate with us’ reported Phipps, ‘he could 
find nothing concrete’.24 It is easy, therefore, to see where the notion of an 
‘English Governess’ came from. 
 
French domestic unrest did much to cement the notion overseas of a 
‘decadent’ nation lacking the moral fibre necessary to withstand the Fascist 
challenge. After the 1936 election even the moderate French press noted 
how the outcome caused ‘some surprise’ in British political circles and 
spawned headlines like ‘Triomphe de Moscou’ and ‘La France rouge’ in 
Germany.25 The Intransigeant urged calm, reminding its readership of the 
external menace and warning that a civil war would precipitate a foreign 
one.26 Extreme-right journals lamented the ‘decomposition’ of French 
parliamentary politics and the pro-Soviet direction of the Popular Front’s 
foreign policy.27 But others sought to reduce ideological tensions. Ahead of 
Bastille Day, right-leaning French war veterans were warned against turning 
the Champs Elysée into a ‘banal battlefield’ between patriots and police, as 
this would only reinforce perceptions of French disorder when the existential 
threat demanded unity and sang-froid.28 Repeated allusions to unrest in the 
French press, especially rhetoric of ‘civil war’, undoubtedly reverberated 
overseas. For British observers, as Herman insists, the emergent picture 
 8 
 
was of a France plagued by political, social and economic weaknesses: ‘It 
would be a truism to state that France was on the brink of civil war with the 
country almost equally divided between left and right’.29 
 
The wave of sit-in strikes that beset the fledgling Popular Front government 
during the summer of 1936 prompted partisan press commentary in France 
that subsequently informed British perceptions. Although British embassy 
staff tapped into other sources of information – personal contacts, consular 
reports, visiting sites of strike action, attending rallies, scrutinizing 
parliamentary debates, etc. – newspapers were an ever-present when trying 
to make sense of a fluid situation.30 Hugh Lloyd Thomas, minister at the 
Paris embassy, tried to resist the ‘alarmist exaggerations’ in the press, but 
confessed nevertheless that the situation was dire, especially from the 
diplomatic perspective. ‘One cannot help feeling’ he wrote, ‘that for the 
moment at least the French Government as a fighting force has ceased to 
exist’.31 Clerk also acknowledged a reliance on newspapers, noting how his 
day-to-day reports were ‘based on information published in the press and on 
reports I have received from His Majesty’s consular officers’.32  
 
Although optimism resurfaced as the 1936 strikes subsided, confidence in 
France was routinely shaken by the frequent re-emergence of social unrest. 
As the Radical Deputy, Lucien Lamoureux, recalled, the factory occupations, 
the Clichy riots in 1937, and the difficulties experienced in hosting the Paris 
International Exposition that same year, combined to fuel a belief elsewhere 
in Europe that France ‘was in the grip of a sort of revolutionary anarchy’.33 
Within the Popular Front, the Radical-Socialists grew alarmed at negative 
British perceptions. Jacques Kayser, one of the Radical’s ‘Young Turks’, 
remarked how the British were not irreconcilably hostile to the Front 
Populaire, but insisted nevertheless that a French financial ‘recovery’ was 
essential.34 Persistent domestic turmoil certainly troubled many in Britain, 
and for Conservatives in particular the pernicious influence of Communism 
was sufficient reason to interpret any British commitment to France as a 
‘liability’.35 By early 1937, Corbin noted that British hostility towards a 
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continental commitment was no longer confined to conservative or 
isolationist papers. Even the Morning Post, he observed, traditionally so 
‘faithfully attached’ to the entente, now published editorials criticizing 
French policy.36  
 
That Britain might desert France was a troubling prospect. France’s 
President, Albert Lebrun, told journalists in February 1937 that newspaper 
content was exploited abroad to attack an apparently unstable and 
fragmented France; journalists must henceforth do their duty by presenting 
instead an image of a united, calm, orderly and industrious nation.37 Paris 
was concerned that London might use France’s internal unrest as a pretext 
for pursuing appeasement with Germany at France’s expense. 
Unsurprisingly, any signs of Anglo-French harmony were received warmly. 
As Phipps (who had replaced Clerk as ambassador in Paris in April 1937) 
told foreign secretary Anthony Eden in November 1937, news of the 
impending visit to London of French Premier Camille Chautemps has had a 
‘reassuring effect … on the French Government and French public 
opinion’.38 However, although grateful for signs of Anglo-French harmony, 
the French press was never sycophantic. In early-1938, as the Front 
populaire began to disintegrate, several newspapers, especially on the left, 
condemned perceived British meddling in France’s internal affairs.39  
 
That the British contemplated such meddling demonstrated their frustration 
at the perpetual instability in Paris. A volatile and vulnerable France was of 
little assistance to Chamberlain in his pursuit of appeasement. He sought a 
stable ally providing ‘firm and continuous support’, but instead found a 
country riddled with internal unrest and frequently-changing governments. 
When Chautemps’ administration fell in January 1938 an exasperated 
Chamberlain described French political instability as ‘a phenomenon of 
Nature which we must just accept’. Corbin warned Paris that the British 
were tiring of France’s persistent ‘domestic quarrels’, no longer viewing it as 
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a relatively harmless inconvenience. Yet another French ministry collapsed 
on 10 March, leaving France without a government when Hitler pulled off 
the Anschluss. ‘France’, lamented Chamberlain ‘has been caught bathing, 
and the world looks to us’.40  
 
Such was the domestic and diplomatic climate confronting Daladier as he 
formed a new ministry in April 1938. His administration marked a distinct 
break from the Popular Front, and one of his first moves was to confront the 
workers by abolishing the 40-hour working week (a central pillar of the 
Popular Front platform). As workers’ unrest intensified in August, Daladier 
took to the airwaves to urge the French people to overcome their differences 
and get ‘back to work’.41 Diplomatically, his government was animated by a 
desire to disabuse the British of their prevailing perceptions of France. 
Daladier sought to demonstrate a rediscovered French unity and resilience, 
encouraged by Winston Churchill who had informed him on 14 April that 
the time was ripe for such an initiative, but he must ‘strike while the iron is 
hot’.42 A visit to London by Daladier and Bonnet was quickly arranged, 
Phipps keen that the British endorse Daladier’s fledgling government which 
was considered a significant improvement on its vacillating and alarmingly 
pro-Soviet predecessors.43 This successful visit was followed in July by an 
equally well-publicised sojourn by the British King and Queen in Paris. The 
French, remarked Oliver Harvey(private secretary to Lord Halifax, Britain’s 
foreign secretary since Eden’s resignation in February 1938), went to 
extraordinary lengths to make the visit a success, in so doing reminding 
both the world and the French themselves of their ‘ability to make a success 
of anything they have a mind to’, an ability that had been ‘forgotten in the 
recent wave of defeatism’.44 The visit afforded France a rare moment of 
cross-party unity, the majority of the press on the left and right seizing the 
opportunity to celebrate the closeness of the two democracies.45 
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Most early reports from the Paris embassy painted Daladier’s administration 
favourably, at least vis-à-vis domestic politics. Ahead of the French 
ministers’ visit to London, Phipps reported that sections of French opinion 
were undergoing a period of soul-searching, not as part of a ‘process of 
aimless disintegration’ but rather as a consequence of ‘the tremendous 
thrust for national union’ which had become the key motif of French 
politics. Although the slow but steady progress in this direction had given 
‘friends of France … legitimate cause for anxiety’, Daladier now had a 
‘golden chance’ to make meaningful progress.46 This opportunity was made 
harder by Hitler’s designs on the Sudetenland. The ensuing crisis dominated 
the diplomatic landscape over the summer of 1938, but France was again 
distracted by internal unrest as the far-left resisted Daladier’s reforms. In 
this context, as Yvon Lacaze has noted, press commentary on the Sudeten 
crisis concluded that the outcome depended entirely on the degree of 
Britain’s commitment to France. Even as Hitler increased his demands 
during September, causing unrest and even resistance in some British 
newspapers, the majority of French journals continued to toe the 
appeasement line, partly on account of pressure exerted by the Quai 
d’Orsay. Unsurprisingly, the Munich reprieve was received warmly, Phipps 
noting how French papers, with few exceptions, were ‘lyrical in their praise’ 
for Chamberlain.47 
 
Daladier himself, however, was less enamoured by the outcome, as 
demonstrated by his well-documented appraisal of the jubilant Parisian 
crowds on his return (‘les fous sont cons!’) and his general comportment in 
photographs and newsreel footage from the time. The substantial press 
cuttings in his personal papers reflect a concern that his actions might 
incur the wrath of the French people. Unlike Chamberlain, who confidently 
brushed aside press criticism, Daladier was profoundly perturbed by hostile 
media voices, particularly those emanating from the left. Also unlike his 
British counterpart, the French premier eschewed hubristic claims of 
securing peace for a generation. Instead, he used a radio broadcast to urge 
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the French people to remain ‘united, hardworking and strong’, the only 
possible safeguard of both domestic and world peace.48 Bonnet too was 
fixated by French press coverage, and in conversations with British embassy 
staff he habitually accused hostile journals of being in the pay of Moscow. 
Phipps proved receptive to the foreign minister’s lamentations, accepting 
Bonnet’s claims that both l’Époque and l’Ordre were backed by Russia, even 
accusing the latter’s director, Émile Buré, of being ‘a slave of the Soviets’.49 
 
After Munich the French government attempted to augment its control over 
the media. On 2 November, Daladier told Phipps that he intended to issue a 
new decree-law to prevent press attacks ‘upon foreign statesmen’, no doubt 
encouraged by British anger at persistent attacks on Chamberlain. Daladier, 
noted Phipps, ‘spoke very bitterly … about the disgraceful attacks in the 
Communist Humanité and by ‘Pertinax [André Géraud] in the Ordre’. 
According to Phipps, the same two journals were the only ones that received 
news of Chamberlain’s impending Paris visit with scepticism rather than 
enthusiasm.50 The French press was clearly divided along munichois and 
antimunichois lines, divisions that Phipps attributed principally to ideology. 
Papers on the right and centre – notably Le Temps, the Jour-Écho de Paris, 
La République and Le Matin - supported appeasement, whilst the moderate-
left and far-left – represented by the Ordre, Le Peuple, l’Œuvre and 
l’Humanité - were opposed.51 
 
Press discussion of Munich subsided, however, as French internal politics 
returned centre-stage. One reason for the primacy of domestic rather than 
foreign issues in French newspapers during the autumn was the calling of a 
General Strike for 30 November, the unions’ response to the programme of 
financial redressement revealed by the new finance minister, Paul Reynaud. 
To defeat the strike and rally the French people to his side, Daladier once 
more turned to the microphone. In a radio broadcast coinciding with the 
twentieth anniversary of the Armistice, the chef de gouvernement stressed 
his credentials as a war veteran, portraying the brotherhood of the anciens 
combattants as an exemplar of national unity for the rest of the country to 
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emulate. To withstand the external threat, he insisted, France must be 
morally and materially strong.52 There is evidence that Daladier’s appeals to 
the country were working. Within his personal papers is a note that stated 
simply, ‘For peace and French security, it would evidently be preferable to 
work than to strike. Such is the general opinion of the French people, 
disgusted by the attitude of the Communists’.53 Furthermore, on 28 
November, after a well-publicized and highly successful visit to Paris by 
Chamberlain and Halifax, Daladier’s press service noted how Parisian and 
provincial papers alike bemoaned the ‘current social agitation’ which could 
only harm France’s position during the ongoing ‘international 
negotiations’.54  
 
That the General Strike was having a negative impact on British opinion had 
already been emphasized by Corbin, who warned that France’s ‘internal 
strife’ was the issue that ‘eclipsed all others’ in British press coverage.55 
Daladier’s use of the radio was proving effective at home, but for British 
observers this medium was less significant than the printed page. In the 
build-up to the General Strike, Daladier, Reynaud and Anatole de Monzie 
(minister for public works) all took to the airwaves urging discipline, and 
although Phipps acknowledged that these broadcasts enjoyed ‘a wide 
reception among wireless listeners’, he regretted that the ‘newspapers of the 
extreme left do not publish them fully, but only give garbled versions’.56. Of 
all the forms of media in operation, British officials still gave primacy to the 
printed press. In mid-November 1938, the Paris embassy’s press attaché, 
Charles Mendl, had lengthy conversations with two prominent French 
journalists, André Géraud (‘Pertinax’) and Geneviève Tabouis. Both 
suggested that French strength and stability could be regained if Paul 
Reynaud’s programme of financial redressement was successful.57 Within 
the British Foreign Office France appeared to be ‘at the parting of the ways’: 
if the Reynaud plan encountered substantial resistance the future remained 
unclear and possibly dangerous; if met with ‘reluctant acquiescence’, the 
future may well see ‘a gradual recovery and immediate increased stability’.58  
 
 14 
 
The outcome of the General Strike was clearly crucial, and Daladier’s 
success in overcoming it with minimal fuss certainly improved France’s 
standing in the eyes of the British. A further opportunity to showcase 
French vitality soon emerged. On 30 November, Italian deputies began 
demanding that France cede Tunis, Corsica and Nice to Italy. The near-
unanimous response in the French press needed no positive spin from 
either the Quai d’Orsay or the British embassy. French newspapers of all 
stripes roundly condemned Mussolini’s provocation, reflecting a broader 
public hostility that was, as Phipps conveyed, amusingly manifested by a 
group of Sorbonne students marching ‘down the Boulevard St. Michel 
shouting for Sardinia, Sicily, “Venice pour nos amoureuses” and Vesuvius’.59 
Italy’s actions, recalled Lamoureux, provoked an ‘emotion’ in France, 
resulting in numerous demonstrations, rallies, and protests.60 This resolve, 
however, threatened to impede Chamberlain’s pursuit of appeasement. News 
of Chamberlain’s intended trip to Rome in January, coupled with an 
editorial in The Times on 17 December advocating a frank discussion of 
Italy’s territorial grievances, prompted alarm in France. Wladimir 
d’Ormesson wrote to a British correspondent that France was ‘absolutely 
unanimous’ in its desire to stand firm against the Italians, and that any 
attempt on Chamberlain’s part to mediate would be ill-received.61 
 
If Daladier had, as Benjamin Martin claims, received ‘a gift from Mussolini’ 
courtesy of the latter’s ill-judged demands,62 he played his hand adroitly. 
Firstly, the claims fostered a spirit of French unity that was used to 
denigrate those on the left espousing social and industrial agitation. 
Secondly, they provided an opportunity to indulge in a celebration of French 
imperial grandeur. Where previously a perception of imperial decay was 
used to legitimize appeasement in Europe63, the imperial theme was used 
after Munich as a symbol of strength rather than weakness.64 The use of 
newsreels to project France’s imperial prestige demonstrated the 
government’s growing attentiveness to the potential of this medium to reach 
vast audiences. Indeed, French cinema attendance peaked during the late-
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1930s, with nearly three-quarters of Parisians regularly attending in 1939.65 
As well as projecting France’s imperial might, newsreels were also used to 
showcase defensive fortifications at home. A Pathé-Journal newsreel shown 
on 30 November 1938 reassured viewers that they could feel ‘safe in their 
homes’.66 The date of broadcast is salient, coinciding with the National 
Strike. The message was unambiguous, bringing into sharper focus the 
failure of the French left (at least its leadership) to defend their country. 
Although the emergent picture was contradictory – proclaiming France to be 
safe from attack whilst simultaneously suggesting that social unrest 
rendered France vulnerable67 – it helped undermine the legitimacy of 
Daladier’s far-left critics. A wedge was driven between the extremist 
leadership and the rank-and-file, most of the latter shying away from 
agitation and demonstrating a willingness to contribute to national 
defence.68  
 
In light of the Italian claims, imperial unity and strength featured 
prominently in newsreels. Daladier’s January trip to France’s Mediterranean 
possessions was widely reported, notably Éclair-Journal’s ‘Le voyage de M. 
Daladier en Corse, Tunisie, et Algérie’. Further officially-sanctioned films 
followed in the spring, celebrating French military might (e.g. La sortie de la 
Flotte en Méditerannée and Marine 1939) and imperial grandeur (L’homme de 
Niger, Brazza ou l’épopée du Congo, La chevauchée héroïque).69 Pathé’s 
award-winning documentary ‘Somme-nous défendus?’ offered the French 
people further assurances of the country’s military preparedness, and the 
public seemed to prefer these upbeat messages to the sombre portrayals of 
decadence and social fragmentation characterizing feature films like Le jour 
se lève and Le règle du jeu, both of which performed poorly at the box 
office.70 Into the spring and summer, Franco-British unity was also stressed 
repeatedly, newsreels lavishing attention on Lebrun’s trip to London in April 
and revelling in the participation of British troops in the 14 juillet 
celebrations in Paris.71  
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Semi-official newsreels not only had an impact on French opinion but 
resonated overseas, notably in Britain. The French companies Pathé and 
Gaumont produced many of the newsreels shown in British cinemas, helping 
French authorities to project a more positive image of France in British 
picture houses. During the winter of 1938-9, Gaumont ran a series of films 
focusing on France, notably its military might and imperial prestige, 
including one commending the ‘good sense of the French working men’ for 
ensuring the failure of the General Strike.72 Daladier’s Mediterranean trip 
was extensively covered, as was the visit of Monsieur and Madame Lebrun to 
London. The re-affirmation of the entente on 14 July was celebrated widely, 
Gaumont proclaiming the two democracies ‘companions in glory, honour 
and determination’.73 
 
By this juncture, the British government had already pledged to guarantee 
France against external aggression, and had even introduced – largely to 
assuage French anxieties – peacetime conscription. Reflecting on the recent 
evolution of French social cohesiveness, Phipps reported in early-March that 
‘the country is now more united to meet a menace from abroad than for 
many years past’, having undergone a ‘steady swing away from the 
extremism’ that had prevailed in 1936. The majority of the people, he 
concluded, sought a ‘moderate but strong Government, and a truce from 
social and political agitation’.74 Daladier’s personal standing was already 
high and would rise further in light of his resolute response to the German 
seizure of Czechoslovakia on 15 March 1939. Although powerless to prevent 
Hitler’s coup, Daladier used the radio to deliver a message of firmness and 
resolve. His speech of 29 March resonated nationally and internationally. 
French newspapers welcomed his firmness, Phipps informing London that 
Daladier’s claim that France ‘had never been so united’ was entirely 
justified.75  
 
Daladier had, albeit belatedly, lived up to his reputation as a ‘strong man’, 
and his use of the airwaves has led one historian to label him ‘L’homme de 
radio’.76 He also demonstrated opportunism, exploiting the Prague coup to 
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secure greater governmental powers (pleins pouvoirs) justified as essential 
for national defence. As the British embassy reported, his request for full 
powers was broadly welcomed by a public that was ‘less concerned with 
party disputes than [with] firmness and leadership from the Government’.77 
He continued to rally popular support for his policies via published and 
broadcast speeches. On 27 June, before the Chamber of Deputies, he 
reiterated French unity and determination to withstand external 
aggression.78 Daladier’s firm language, noted Corbin, is ‘welcomed in 
England’ as evidence ‘of the sacrifices being made’ by the French people.79 
His government’s success in galvanising a previously fractured country did 
not go unrecognised at the time. As Lamoureux recalled, Daladier’s 
popularity was extraordinarily high, having stabilised the government, re-
established order, improved the nation’s finances, and adopted a firmer line 
against the Dictators.80 The Paris embassy largely concurred, suggesting 
that the severity of the international crisis had silenced ‘all but the most 
irreconcilable critics’, the majority of the French populace seeking a ‘strong 
Government’ rather than a ‘re-intensification of party quarrels’.81  
 
 
In little over a year since becoming President of the Council, Daladier had 
made a concerted effort to use the media to harness support and re-
invigorate the French nation. As Alexander Werth observed, Daladier ‘took 
upon himself the task of preparing France … both materially and 
psychologically’ for war. In sparking this French ‘revivalism’, however, he 
occasionally assumed a ‘dictatorial air’; Werth even suggested that there was 
a ‘streak of Vichy-ism’ to Daladier, and this is evident in his treatment of the 
media.82 On 4 February 1939, a decree law brought radio news broadcasts 
under the central control of the centre permanent de l’information générale.83 
The printed press was a harder beast to tame, but here too Daladier 
exploited the severity of the external menace to justify increased state 
control. A series of decree-laws were passed in early-1939 giving the 
government greater powers to prohibit the publication and dissemination of 
journals suspected of being mouthpieces for foreign governments. The News 
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Department of the British foreign office, commenting on Daladier’s efforts to 
control the press, suggested in May 1939 that he ‘has shown signs recently 
of increasingly dictatorial manners & methods’.84 On 29 July, further 
measures were passed increasing government control of the radio and 
cinema, and even facilitating the creation of a propaganda ministry.85 In 
late-August, the Nazi-Soviet Pact gave Daladier the opportunity he craved to 
silence his most consistent and virulent critics, prohibiting publication of 
the Communist journals L’Humanité and Ce Soir.  
 
When war came in September 1939, the British were confident that France 
was a worthwhile ally. This had not always been the case. For much of the 
1930s the image of France emanating from the media (on both sides of the 
Channel) had sustained a contrary impression, of a nation divided 
domestically and utterly reliant on Britain internationally. But, as Michael 
Dockrill has argued, reservations about France that were commonplace in 
Britain in the mid-1930s were overcome by 1939.86 For John Herman, this 
owed much to the reports being furnished by ambassador Phipps; where he 
had portrayed a weak and pacifist France unready for war in September 
1938 he evoked a resolute nation prepared for conflict less than a year 
later.87 To an extent, therefore, this article seeks to restore some agency to 
the French themselves in explaining the more favourable impressions of 
France now being harboured in Britain. Daladier’s administration was 
proactive in creating more positive perceptions of France abroad, firstly 
taking steps to overcome social unrest and later by galvanising French 
opinion behind a foreign policy of firmness that London would subsequently 
ascribe to. France’s ability to become more assertive within the Franco-
British partnership owed much to a significant shift in media 
representations of that country, a shift that was, at least in part, cultivated 
intentionally. 
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